تأثیر ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس با تأکید بر ویژگی‌های بازار شرکت‌های بورس اوراق بهادار تهران

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی (کاربردی)

نویسندگان

1 عضو هیئت علمی، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران.

2 دانشجوی دکتری، گروه حسابداری، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه کردستان، سنندج، ایران.

چکیده

مهم‌ترین و با‌‌‌ارزش‌ترین خدمت حرفه حسابرسی، اظهارنظر مستقل و کارشناسانه درباره مطلوبیت صورت‌های مالی است. صورت‌های مالی، ادعاهای اظهارشده مدیریت است. اظهارنظر در قالب گزارش حسابرسی صورت می‌گیرد و عوامل مختلفی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس تأثیر می‌گذارند. هدف از این پژوهش، بررسی تأثیر ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس با تأکید بر ویژگی‌های بازار شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران است. به‌منظور دستیابی به هدف پژوهش، تعداد 174 شرکت از میان شرکت‌های پذیرفته‌شده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سال‌های 1396-1390 به روش نمونه‌گیری حذف سیستماتیک انتخاب و در مجموع 1218 (سال- شرکت) برای انجام تحلیل در نظر گرفته شدند. به‌منظور بررسی روابط بین متغیرها از مدل رگرسیونی لجستیک نیز برای آزمون فرضیه‌ها از روش داده‌های ترکیبی استفاده شد. برای محاسبه ویژگی‌های بازار، از چهار معیار مالکیت غیردولتی، سرمایه‌گذاران نهادی، مالکیت مدیریتی و مجازات‌های سخت‌گیرانه استفاده گردیده است. یافته‌های پژوهش نشان داد که ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس، تأثیر منفی دارد. احتمال صدور گزارش مطلوب توسط حسابرسان در شرکت‌های غیردولتی، بیشتر از شرکت‌های دولتی است. وجود سهامدارن نهادی تأثیر ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس را تضعیف می‌کند و مالکیت مدیریتی نیز تأثیر ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس را تضعیف می­کند لکن در صورت وجود مجازات‌های سخت‌گیرانه ارتباطات سیاسی بر اظهارنظر حسابرس، تأثیر معناداری ندارد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

The Impact of Political Relations on Auditor's Opinion with Emphasis on Market Characteristics of Companies Listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange

نویسندگان [English]

  • Reza Jamei 1
  • Nashmin Lotfi Joo 2
1 Faculty Member, Department of Accounting, Faculty of Humanities, University of Kurdistan (UOK), Sanandaj, Iran.
2 PhD Student. Department of Accounting, Faculty of Humanities, University of Kurdistan (UOK), Sanandaj, Iran.
چکیده [English]

The most important and valuable service of the auditing profession is independent and expert comment on the desirability of financial statements. Financial statements are claims made by management. The opinion is made in the form of an audit report. Various factors affect the auditor's opinion. The purpose of this study was to investigate the effect of political relations on the auditor's comments by emphasizing the market characteristics of companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In order to achieve the research goal, 174 companies were selected from the companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2011 to 2017 by systematic removal sampling method and a total of 1218 companies were selected (year - company) for analysis. Logistic regression model was used to investigate the relationships between the variables and the combined data method was used to test the hypotheses. Four criteria of non-governmental ownership, institutional investors, managerial ownership and severe penalties were used to calculate market characteristics. The findings demonstrated that political relations have a negative impact on the auditor's comments. It is more likely that auditors of non-state companies issue desirable reports than the auditors of state companies. The presence of institutional shareholders undermines the impact of political relations on the auditor's comments. In addition, managerial ownership undermines the impact of political relations on the auditor's comments. However, in the presence of severe penalties, political relations have no significant effect on the auditor's opinion. 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Auditing
  • Auditor opinion
  • Political relations
  • Market characteristics
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